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Free Speech Implications of Apple’s Patent for
Infrared Tech That Can Remotely Disable Video
and Photo Recording
BY DAVID FORREST / ON OCTOBER 26, 2016

Apple is accustomed to being a controversial pioneer in the tech world. Yet, a patent it was
recently awarded is garnering more than the usual interest, and not for positive reasons. The
patent entitled “[s]ystems and methods for receiving infrared data with a camera designed to
detect images based on visible light,”[1] essentially discloses a method for a smartphone’s
camera to receive data over infrared waves that could alter the functionality of an
iPhone.[2] The patent drawing sheets suggest that the technology be used to disable
photography and video capture at live concerts and theater events.[3] A theater or concert
venue wishing to employ the technology can be equipped with an infrared transmitter which
can emit an infrared signal instructing individual iPhones in the premises to disable video
recording capabilities.[4] At a first glance, this technology appears to be only a step from
technology currently used to curtail bootlegging at live events, such as requiring patrons to
place their cellphones in a pouch that prevents the phone from recording.[5] However,
commentators instantly suspected that this technology was different, prompting some to ask
whether the technology could eventually be used by the federal government or the police to
block photo and video recording at a political protest or another sensitive event, making
recording of these events impossible.[6] The use of the newly patented technology in this
manner has the potential to affect our First Amendment right to free speech, while
simultaneously affecting copyright law. However, a prospective litigant attempting to
challenge the use of the technology on First Amendment grounds would face numerous
challenges.
In order to satisfy the Article III’s “Cases” and “Controversies” requirement, a litigant must
demonstrate that they have standing to sue.[7] To establish Article III standing, an injury must
be “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and redressable by a favorable ruling.”[8] Courts also recognize doctrines of mootness,
ripeness, and political question as prudential limitations on Article III standing.[9] In Clapper v.
Amnesty International, Amnesty International challenged a law that permitted federal
government officials to acquire foreign intelligence information by intercepting
communications between US citizens and those in foreign countries.[10] The plaintiffs alleged
that their work engaged them in sensitive international communications with individuals who
they believe are likely targets of surveillance, which in turn had a chilling effect on their
communications.[11] The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs’ claims were too speculative
and that allegations of future injury are insufficient to establish an injury in fact.[12] A plaintiff
attempting to bring a case challenging the government’s use of the new technology at this

time would lack standing for the same reasons that the plaintiffs in Clapper lacked standing,
allegations of potential future injury are insufficient for purposes of Article III standing.[13]
Additionally, the prudential limitation of ripeness would remove standing in any case brought
at this time. A case is not ripe if the dispute is insufficiently developed and is instead too
remote or speculative to warrant judicial action.[14] In Laird v. Tatum, the United States
Supreme Court dismissed for lack of ripeness a claim in which the plaintiff accused the U.S.
Army of alleged unlawful “surveillance of lawful civilian political activity.”[15] The Court
determined that the plaintiffs’ claims of a “chilling effect” on the exercise of their First
Amendment rights rested on fear of future punitive action based on results of surveillance
and the “speculative apprehensiveness” that the army may misuse the information in a way
that would directly harm the plaintiffs and did not amount to objective current harm.[16]
Although the federal government and its agents do not have access to the technology at this
point, it is easy to imagine a hypothetical scenario in which an officer of the federal
government utilizes the infrared technology to prevent iPhones from recording at a sensitive
event. However, even if this scenario existed, a court would dismiss a suit challenging the
government policy preventing iPhones from recording, as it “leave[s] open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information” as required by the First
Amendment.[17] Though some iPhone users may not see other smartphones as reasonable
alternatives to an iPhone, the fact is that other smartphones are capable of recording videos
and taking pictures. As long as the infrared technology’s reach is limited to iPhones,
consumers may avoid a conflict by purchasing another brand of smartphone. Moreover, the
traditional media news networks provide yet another reasonable alternative. While Apple’s
newly patented technology capable of preventing iPhones from recording video is certainly
troubling, its use does not violate the First Amendment.
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